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INTRODUCTION

The judicial approach of U.S. courts toward arbitration has evolved
significantly since the enactment of the United States Arbitration Act
(“FAA”)1 in 1925. Prior to this Act, it was “settled law . . . that an
agreement to arbitrate would not be specifically enforced in United States
Courts, nor be recognized as a defense to an action.”2 The prevailing
*

Assistant Professor, University of Alberta Faculty of Law.
1. 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–16 (2018). This first chapter of the FAA continues to apply to
arbitration agreements concerning “maritime transactions” or “any other matters in foreign
commerce,” including “commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in
any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia.” Id. at § 1. Chapter One
also “applies to actions and proceedings brought under [Chapter Two] to the extent that
chapter is not in conflict with [Chapter Two] or the Convention [on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards] as ratified by the United States.” 9 U.S.C.A. §
208 (2018).
2. Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Anaconda, 138 F.2d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 1943) (stating that
“prior to the enactment of the arbitration act . . . an agreement to arbitrate would not be
specifically enforced in United States Courts” because “parties may not by private
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attitude of the courts toward arbitration before the FAA was therefore one
of “disapproval”3 and “hostility.”4 Gradually, the Supreme Court of the
United States (“Supreme Court”) came to recognize that “we are well past
the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the
competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as
an alternative means of dispute resolution.”5 Accordingly, the Court held
that “[a]n agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a
specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of
suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute,”6 thereby
placing arbitration “on a level playing field with judicial proceedings.”7
The same reasoning applies, perhaps with even greater force, to
international commercial arbitration agreements.8 Such agreements are
agreement oust the jurisdiction of the courts”); see also Cont’l Grain Co. v. Dant & Russell,
Inc., 118 F.2d 967, 969 (9th Cir. 1941) (“Prior to the enactment of the United States
arbitration act (1925) [arbitration] agreements could not be enforced in the courts of the
United States.”); Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1924) (“The
federal courts—like those of the states and of England—have, both in equity and at law,
denied, in large measure, the aid of their processes to those seeking to enforce executory
agreements to arbitrate disputes.”); Tatsuuma Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prescott, 4 F.2d
670, 672–73 (9th Cir. 1925) (“[W]hile the rule under consideration [that an agreement
which leaves the disposition of the whole matter to arbitration is not a bar to an action in
court] has been criticised and its wisdom questioned, it is nevertheless the established law in
the courts of the United States, from which the inferior federal courts are not at liberty to
depart.”).
3. DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins., PLC, 202 F.3d 71, 75 (1st Cir. 2000).
4. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir.
1942).
5. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27
(1985); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57, 66 (1995)
(stating that the Federal Arbitration Act aims “to ensure the enforceability, according to
their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate”) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs.
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)).
6. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
7. PEDRO J. MARTINEZ-FRAGA, THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS AND DISCOVERY METHODS 31
(2009).
8. The Supreme Court has recognized the advantages of international arbitration from
the early days of the country’s adoption of the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and on several occasions has provided guidance
on the interpretation of the FAA and the implementation of its pro-arbitration policy. It has
held that “[a] contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall
be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business
transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates the danger that a dispute under the
agreement might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or
unfamiliar with the problem area involved. A parochial refusal by the courts of one country
to enforce an international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes,
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governed by Chapter Two of the FAA, enacted in 1970,9 which
incorporates10 the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention” or “Convention”).11
but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure
tactical litigation advantages. . . . [T]he dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-man’s-land
would surely damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the
willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements.”
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1974). Accordingly, “[t]o determine
that ‘American standards of fairness’ . . . must nonetheless govern the controversy
[notwithstanding an international arbitration clause] demeans the standards of justice
elsewhere in the world, and unnecessarily exalts the primacy of United States law over the
laws of other countries.” Id. at 517 n.11. A decade later, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court held that “concerns of international comity, respect
for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that
we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be
forthcoming in a domestic context.” 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985). Therefore, “the emphatic
federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution . . . applies with special force in the field
of international commerce.” Id. at 631.
9. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2018). This second chapter of the FAA applies only to an
arbitration agreement or award that “falls under the Convention,” as defined in § 202.
10. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2018) (“The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in
accordance with this chapter.”).
11. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entering into force with respect to the United States on Dec. 29,
1970). At the time of writing, the Convention has 162 Parties. Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XX
II-1&chapter=22&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/AXT4-TTBN] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020). It
has thus been said to play “a fundamental role in making arbitration the most popular means
of dispute resolution in international trade.” Domenico Di Pietro, General Remarks on
Arbitrability Under the New York Convention, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL &
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 85 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009).
It has also been viewed as “the most successful international juridic accomplishment of the
past century” (MARTINEZ-FRAGA, supra note 7, at 151) and as “the single most important
pillar on which the edifice of international arbitration rests” (ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW
AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 133 (4th ed. 2004)).
The United States entered two reservations upon accession to the Convention: first, “[t]he
United States of America will apply the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the
recognition and enforcement of only those awards made in the territory of another
Contracting State[,]” and second, “[t]he United States of America will apply the Convention
only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are
considered as commercial under the national law of the United States.” Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XX
II-1&chapter=22&clang=_en#EndDec [https://perma.cc/AXT4-TTBN] (last visited Feb. 7,
2020). Even though the Convention was approved by the U.S. in October 1968, the
instrument of accession was not deposited until Chapter Two of the FAA was enacted into
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The Supreme Court has stated that the invalidation of an international
commercial arbitration agreement would “reflect a ‘parochial concept that
all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . . We
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
courts.’”12
Nonetheless, antagonism toward international commercial arbitration
seems to persist in some U.S. courts, even in the face of the clear federal
policy in favor of arbitration.13 One area in which hostility to arbitration
has recently surfaced concerns the meaning of the “in writing” requirement
of Article II(1) of the Convention14 where non-signatories are involved.15
The term “in writing” is defined in Article II(2) as including “an arbitral
clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.”16 It has long been
law, since the President and Congress believed that “[c]hanges in the Federal Arbitration
Act (title 9 of the United States Code) [were] required before the United States bec[ame]
party to the [C]onvention.” ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 382 (4th
Cir. 2012).
12. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
13. As noted by the Supreme Court, “‘[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing
the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered,’ a concern which
‘requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.’” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625–26 (1985).
14. The Article provides that “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in
writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all of any differences
which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable to settlement
by arbitration.” Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards art. II(1), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
15. The term “non-signatories” is admittedly used at times “largely out of laziness” and
may be “over-inclusive since under the law of most jurisdictions, arbitration agreements
don’t have to be signed anyway,” even between their original parties. Alan Scott Rau,
“Consent” to Arbitral Jurisdiction: Disputes with Non-Signatories, in MULTIPLE PARTY
ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 105 (Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2009);
Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Extension of Arbitration Agreements to Third Parties: A Never
Ending Legal Quest Through the Spatial-temporal Continuum, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 138 n.1 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kröll eds., 2011) (“The
author is cognisant that the term ‘non-signatories’ may not be entirely synonymous with
third parties, as arbitration agreements need not be reduced to signed documents owing to
the fact that parties may themselves have concluded their arbitration agreement by
exchanged communications or the like and are accordingly non-signatories as well.”).
However, the term is apt for present purposes since it reflects precisely the issue examined
in this article—that some American courts have found parties to the dispute before them not
to be bound by an arbitration agreement merely because they have not signed it, even
though they may otherwise be “parties” to it.
16. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art.
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accepted in international commercial arbitration practice that this “in
writing” requirement, insofar as it evidences the parties’ consent to
arbitrate their dispute(s), is to be interpreted liberally.17 Accordingly, some
domestic arbitration laws and courts have expanded the definition of “in
writing,” or dispensed with it altogether. Most jurisdictions also allow the
application of international commercial arbitration agreements to parties
that have not signed them on the basis of various legal and equitable
doctrines such as agency, piercing the corporate veil, and estoppel.18 The
extent to which these doctrines are available to non-signatories attempting
II(2), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
17. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 57–58 (2012).
There is also a well observed distinction between the requirements of Article II(2), which
are considered as relating to the “formal validity” of arbitration agreements, and issues of
consent, which are considered as relating to the “substantive validity” of arbitration
agreements. See, e.g., id. at 70. For present purposes, however, this distinction will not be
observed, for two reasons. First, the rights and obligations of non-signatories straddle both
the formal and substantive validity of arbitration agreements. Second, part of the confusion
created by recent decisions of U.S. Courts of Appeals discussed in this article arises
precisely from their failure to maintain this distinction. Another common distinction not
observed in this article is that between courts’ findings on jurisdiction and merits in the
context of enforcing arbitration agreements. This is because in the U.S. a determination of
whether the arbitration agreement is “in writing” within the meaning of the Convention is
required both for finding federal subject-matter jurisdiction and for applying the agreement
to a non-signatory. While some courts have observed this distinction and applied a different
standard to the “in writing” requirement at each stage, many of the decisions discussed here
do not. In any event, the focal point of the article is the examination of when courts have
imposed a signature requirement in order to satisfy the “in writing” requirement and enforce
international arbitration agreements, whether this was done as a jurisdictional requirement
or on the merits of the parties’ claims.
18. A discussion of these and other legal or equitable doctrines used by courts to apply
arbitration agreements to non-signatories is beyond the scope of this article. For such a
discussion see, e.g., Wahab, supra note 15, at 144–71; BORN, supra note 17, at 96–99; ALAN
REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 148–52
(4th ed. 2004); NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 85–92 (6th ed. 2015); ANDREA MARCO STEINGRUBER, CONSENT IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 144–64 (2012); Stavros Brekoulakis, Parties in International
Arbitration: Consent v. Commercial Reality, in THE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 119–60 (Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian D.M. Lew & Loukas
Mistelis eds., 2016); Bernard Hanotiau, Groups of Companies in International Arbitration,
in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 279–90 (Loukas M. Mistelis &
Julian D. M. Lew eds., 2006); James M. Hosking, The Third Party Non-Signatory’s Ability
to Compel International Commercial Arbitration: Doing Justice Without Destroying
Consent, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 469 (2004); Stavros Brekoulakis, Rethinking Consent in
International Commercial Arbitration: A General Theory for Non-Signatories, 8 J. INT’L
DISP. SETTLEMENT 610 (2017); J. Douglas Uloth & J. Hamilton Rial, III, Equitable Estoppel
as a Basis for Compelling Nonsignatories to Arbitrate—A Bridge Too Far, 21 REV. LITIG.
593 (2002).
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to invoke an arbitration agreement, or to those wishing to bind them to such
an agreement, differs across jurisdictions and is largely contextual.
However, the fact that such legal and/or equitable grounds are, in principle,
available in lieu of an actual signature to evidence consent to arbitrate has
now been accepted internationally and by most modern arbitration
jurisdictions.19
Not so in the United States, where a Circuit split has emerged from
findings of the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits that,
unless an international commercial arbitration agreement was actually
signed by the parties to the dispute before them, that dispute cannot be
referred to arbitration.20 The question arising from this split may be simply
put as follows: do individuals or entities that have not signed an
international commercial arbitration agreement nonetheless have a right, or
an obligation, to arbitrate under it? The Supreme Court now has the
opportunity to provide a much-needed answer to this question in an
appeal21 from the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit (“Eleventh Circuit”) in Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, et
al. v. GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp.22
A brief summary of the facts of the case and the District Court’s
19. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1404–1524 (2d ed.
2014).
20. See infra pp. 26–31. U.S. courts at both the trial and appellate levels also seem split
on other non-signatory related issues. See S.I. Strong, What Constitutes an “Agreement in
Writing” in International Commercial Arbitration? Conflicts Between the New York
Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 47, 49 (2012) (referring to
several cases in which certiorari was sought from the Supreme Court on non-signatory
related issues, including: 1) Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil
Co., No. 97-409, 1997 WL 33549149 (Sept. 8, 1997), where the question presented to the
Supreme Court concerned legal doctrines allowing for the binding of non-signatory
corporate affiliates; 2) Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i–ii, Neilson v. Seaboard Corp., No.
08-65, 2008 WL 2773349 (July 14, 2008), where the question presented to the Supreme
Court was: “Does Article II(2) of the Convention require arbitration of the employer’s
claims when the employment agreement prepared and signed by the employer contains an
arbitration clause, was tendered to an employee but not signed by him, and thereafter was
performed without objection by either party and arbitration is sought by the employee?”).
21. GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC,
SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ge-energy-power-conversion-f
rance-sas-v-outokumpu-stainless-usa-llc/ [https://perma.cc/BN6N-LRD3] (last visited Feb.
23, 2020) (showing that the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted on June 28, 2019).
22. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir.
2018) [hereinafter Outokumpu v. GE]. Oral argument was heard on Jan. 21, 2020. GE
Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA LCC, SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ge-energy-power-conversion-france-sas-v-out
okumpu-stainless-usa-llc/ [https://perma.cc/BN6N-LRD3] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). The
Supreme Court has yet to render its decision in the case at the time of writing.
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decision23 will set the stage for further analysis.
The plaintiff,
Outokumpu—a steel plant operator in Alabama—entered into three
contracts with Fives—an American subsidiary of a French corporation—to
provide it with three cold rolling mills (the “Contracts”).24 Each mill
required three motors, and Fives subcontracted with defendant GE—a
foreign entity—to provide all nine motors.25
“The motors were
manufactured in France and delivered and installed in Alabama between
2011 and 2012.”26 By August 2015, all three of the mill motors failed and
“Outokumpu approached Fives about replacing or repairing the motors.”27
The Contracts defined “Outokumpu as the ‘Buyer’ and Fives as the
‘Seller’” and referred to them “collectively as ‘Parties.’”28 They further
provided that “[w]hen Seller is mentioned it shall be understood as Subcontractors included, except if expressly stated otherwise,” and “Subcontractor” was defined as “any person (other than the Seller) used by the
Seller for the supply of any part of the Contract Equipment, or any person
to whom any part of the Contract has been sub-let by the Seller[.]”29
Appended to the Contracts was a subcontractor list that enumerated the
“mandatory” vendors from which Fives could select suppliers, including
GE.30 Each Contract also contained an arbitration clause providing that
“[a]ll disputes arising between both parties in connection with or in the
performance of the Contract shall be settled through friendly consultation
23. The case was heard by the Eleventh Circuit on appeal from the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama in Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC v. Converteam
SAS, No. 16-00378-KD-C, 2017 WL 401951 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 2017) [hereinafter District
Court]. The same District Court rendered a decision on Feb. 3, 2019, granting GE’s motion
to compel arbitration against the other plaintiffs, Outokumpu’s insurers (Outokumpu
Stainless USA LLC v. Converteam SAS, No. 16-00378-KD-C, 2017 WL 480716 (S.D. Ala.
Feb. 3, 2017)). GE adopted and incorporated the arguments from its earlier motion to
compel arbitration against Outokumpu in its motion to compel arbitration against the
insurers. Although the insurers raised different arguments than Outokumpu (e.g., that EG
waived its right to arbitrate), these arguments were not addressed by the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit in its decision. Therefore, this article focuses on the District
Court’s decision of Jan. 30, 2017.
24. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2018).
25. Id. at 1321.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. GE and Fives had entered into a subcontractor agreement three weeks after the
Contracts were executed. Under the subcontractor agreement, GE was to provide electrical
equipment for the mills and was “acting as subcontractor” of Fives. Outokumpu Stainless
USA LLC v. Converteam SAS, No. 16-00378-KD-C, 2017 WL 401951, at *1 (S.D. Ala.
Jan. 30, 2017).
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between both parties. In case no agreement can be reached through
consultation . . . any such dispute shall be submitted to arbitration for
settlement.”31 Any arbitration was to “take place in Dusseldorf, Germany
in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce” and in accordance with the substantive law of Germany.32
In 2016, Outokumpu filed suit against GE in the Circuit Court of
Mobile County, Alabama. GE removed the suit to the federal District
Court based on federal subject matter jurisdiction,33 while Outokumpu
moved to remand back to the state court. A federal Magistrate Judge
determined that the removal was proper.34 The District Court adopted the
Magistrate’s report and recommendation and found removal proper under
the Convention and the FAA since the case “related to” the arbitration
agreement found in the Contracts and that arbitration agreement fell under
the Convention.35 The Court therefore denied Outokumpu’s motion to
remand. GE then moved to dismiss and compel arbitration.36
The District Court noted that it must be “mindful that the [FAA]
‘generally establishes a strong presumption in favor of arbitration of
international commercial disputes.’”37
Accordingly, in determining
whether to compel arbitration under the FAA, “a court conducts ‘a very
limited inquiry’” as to whether or not an arbitration agreement falls within
the New York Convention.38 This inquiry is based on four factors set out in
Bautista v. Star Cruises,39 one of which being that the “agreement [is] in
31. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1320–21
(11th Cir. 2018).
32. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th
Cir. 2018).
33. GE removed the action from the Circuit Court to the Federal District Court on the
ground, inter alia, of federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 205 (2018),
which authorizes removal of an action “[w]here the subject matter [of an action or
proceeding pending in a State court] relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling
under the [New York] Convention.” On motions to remove in international arbitration cases
see Holly Wilson, Rethinking Removal and “Relates to”: International Arbitration Disputes
and the N.Y. Convention, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 451 (2018).
34. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, No. CA 16-0378-KD-C,
2016 WL 7423406 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 21, 2016).
35. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, No. 16-0378-KD-C, 2016
WL 7422675 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 2016).
36. Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth Petrochemicals, Inc., 334 F.Supp.
1013, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (“A motion to compel arbitration . . . is simply a request for an
order compelling specific performance of part of a contract.”).
37. Outkumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, No. 16-00378-KD-C, 2017
WL 480716, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 2017).
38. Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005).
39. Id. at 1294 n.7. The remaining three factors are that: “(2) the agreement provides
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writing within the meaning of the Convention.”40 A motion to compel
arbitration must be granted “so long as (1) the four jurisdictional
prerequisites are met and (2) no available affirmative defense under the
Convention applies,” namely that the agreement is “null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed,” pursuant to Article II.41
With regard to the Bautista requirement that the agreement be “in
writing” within the meaning of the Convention, GE argued that it was
included under the definition of “Seller” in the Contracts, being Fives’ subcontractor, and that the phrase “both parties” in the arbitration clause meant
the “Buyer” and “Seller.”42 In contrast, Outokumpu argued that the use of
the phrase “both parties” in the arbitration clause limited the signatories to
only two parties: Outokumpu and Fives, and operated to expressly exclude
subcontractors like GE from the interpretation of “Seller.”43 “Viewing the
[Contracts] as a whole and construing any ambiguities against
[Outokumpu] as the drafter,” the District Court found that “the plain
language of the arbitration provisions, supports a reasonable interpretation
that subcontractors are not expressly excluded from the meaning of
‘parties’ in the arbitration provisions. There is simply no express statement,
as required by the [Contracts], whereby the subcontractors are excluded as
‘Seller’ or ‘parties.’”44 The District Court accordingly held, on the basis of
generally accepted principles of contract law, that GE was a party to the
Contracts by virtue of the interpretation of “Seller” as including the
subcontractors, and therefore that the parties had an agreement “in writing”
within the meaning of the New York Convention.45 Having also found that
the remainder of the Bautista factors were satisfied, the District Court
granted GE’s motion to compel arbitration.46
The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the District Court’s order
compelling arbitration for further proceedings, but upheld the District
for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the Convention; (3) the agreement arises out
of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered commercial; and (4)
a party to the agreement is not an American citizen, or that the commercial relationship has
some reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.”
40. As already noted, the term “agreement in writing” is defined by the Convention as
“an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties.”
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. II(2), June
10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
41. Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC v. Converteam SAS, No. 16-00378-KD-C, 2017
WL 401951, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 2017).
42. Id. at *6.
43. Id. at 6–7.
44. Id. 7–8.
45. Id. at 8–9.
46. Id. at 9–12.
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Court’s dismissal of Outokumpu’s motion to remand.47 GE appealed the
Court’s decision to the Supreme Court. GE’s petition for writ of certiori
presented the following question to the Supreme Court: “[w]hether the
Convention . . . permits a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement to
compel arbitration based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel.”48 While
the question is specific to the doctrine of equitable estoppel, it necessarily
invokes the preliminary question of whether or not consent to arbitration
must be evidenced by a signature. If the answer is affirmative, no
equitable, or for that matter, legal, doctrine could assist a non-signatory
attempting to invoke an arbitration agreement.49 The Eleventh Circuit’s
position on this issue is that GE “cannot avoid U.S. and international
arbitration law that require that the parties sign an agreement to arbitrate
the dispute between them.”50 This article challenges this statement and sets
out to illustrate that such a requirement is controversial under U.S. law, and
practically non-existent under international commercial arbitration law.
Parts II and III of the article set out the main findings of the Eleventh
Circuit and identify the problematic aspects of its decision. Part IV places
the reasoning of the Court in the context of previous federal Courts of
Appeals and District Courts’ decisions concerning the signature
requirement under the Convention. Part V assesses the compatibility of the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision with generally accepted principles of
international commercial arbitration and the prevailing interpretation of the
Convention by foreign courts and by leading commentators. Part VI
concludes that should the U.S. wish to preserve its reputation as a “proarbitration jurisdiction,”51 its courts ought to follow the internationally

47. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1327 (11th
Cir. 2018).
48. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *i, GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS,
Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, No. 18-1048, 2019 WL 559565 (Feb. 7, 2019).
For an analysis of the application of equitable estoppel to non-signatories to international
arbitration agreements, see Tamar Meshel, Of International Commercial Arbitration, NonSignatories, and American Federalism: The Case for a Federal Equitable Estoppel Rule,
56(2) STAN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2020).
49. GE’s Petition notes this broader question of “whether the Convention allows a nonsignatory to compel arbitration.” Id. at *3.
50. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2018).
51. The US Supreme Court Confirms the United States Is a Pro-Arbitration
Jurisdiction, DENTONS (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.dentons.com/en/pdf-pages/generateins
ightpdf?isPdf=true&ItemId=M/DoVSFQWzICWATorQ69tCdH2Vg2d/5BUb+hAkfj7Xw7f
oqnqG5x7w== [https://perma.cc/K6L8-T92Q]. The notion of a pro-arbitration jurisdiction,
however, is contentious. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, What Does It Mean to Be ‘ProArbitration’?, 34 ARB. INT’L 341, 347 (2018).

2020] CAUGHT BETWEEN THE FAA AND THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 687
accepted liberal interpretation and application of the Convention’s “in
writing” requirement in the context of non-signatories to international
commercial arbitration agreements.
II.

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S FINDINGS

The Eleventh Circuit was faced with two questions on appeal. The
first question related to Outokumpu’s motion to remand the case to the
state court, and concerned “whether an action between a buyer and a subcontractor of a seller ‘relates to’ an arbitration agreement signed by the
buyer and seller sufficient to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction.”52
The second question related to GE’s motion to compel arbitration, and
concerned “whether a non-signatory sub-contractor may compel arbitration
against the buyer under that arbitration agreement.”53 The Eleventh Circuit
noted that “[f]ederal policy favors arbitral dispute resolution”54 and that the
FAA “sets forth a clear presumption—’a national policy’—in favor of
arbitration.”55 Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to apply this proarbitration policy only to the first question on the motion to remand, while
disregarding it in the context of the second question on the motion to
compel arbitration.
Regarding the motion to remand, the Eleventh Circuit noted the
“broad grounds for removal” under § 205 of the FAA “[w]here the subject
matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court relates to an
arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention.”56
Accordingly, courts are to perform “a limited inquiry on the face of the
pleadings and the removal notice”57 to determine (1) whether the arbitration
agreement “falls under the Convention” pursuant to the Bautista factors,
and (2) whether the suit “relates to” the arbitration agreement.58 As applied
by the Eleventh Circuit, “this initial jurisdictional inquiry is distinct from a
determination of whether the parties are bound to arbitrate” and should not
involve an examination of “whether the arbitration agreement binds the
parties before it.”59
Under the first step of this analysis, the Eleventh Circuit applied the
52. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2018).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1322.
55. Id. at 1326.
56. Id. at 1323.
57. Id. at 1320.
58. Id. at 1324.
59. Id. at 1324.
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Bautista test “to the four corners of the arbitration agreement” and asked
“whether the removing party has articulated a non-frivolous basis” for the
four factors of the test.60 The Court dispensed with the first factor—”that
there is an agreement in writing”—swiftly, citing Article II(2) of the
Convention and finding that “[b]ecause the Contracts are signed by
Outokumpu and Fives, the Contracts satisfy the first factor.”61
Under the second step of the analysis, the Eleventh Circuit followed
previous decisions of sister Circuits, finding that the term “relates to” is to
be interpreted broadly so that “whenever an arbitration agreement falling
under the Convention could conceivably affect the outcome of the
plaintiff’s case, the agreement ‘relates to’ to the plaintiff’s suit sufficient
for removal jurisdiction.”62 The court is only to determine for this purpose
“whether, on the face of the pleadings and the removal notice, there is a
non-frivolous claim that the lawsuit relates to an arbitration agreement that
‘falls under the Convention.’”63 In this regard, the Eleventh Circuit found
that “the arbitration agreement contained in [the] Contracts is sufficiently
related to the instant dispute such that it could conceivably affect the
outcome of this case.”64 The Eleventh Circuit accordingly upheld the
District Court’s dismissal of Outokumpu’s motion to remand.
The Eleventh Circuit diverged from the District Court’s reasoning,
however, with respect to GE’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that
the District Court wrongly “trac[ed]” and “[i]nsert[ed]” the definitions of
“Buyer,” “Seller,” and “Parties” into the arbitration clause.65 Both courts
recognized that in a motion to compel arbitration, only a “very limited
inquiry” is required into whether or not an arbitration agreement falls
within the Convention under the Bautista test.66 Nonetheless, the Eleventh
Circuit proceeded to find that this inquiry necessarily engages “a more
rigorous analysis of the Bautista factors” than a motion to remand, in order
to “determine whether the parties before the district court entered into an
agreement under the meaning of the Convention to arbitrate their
dispute.”67 Applying this approach to GE’s motion, the Eleventh Circuit
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1323.
63. Id. at 1324.
64. Id. at 1325.
65. Id. at 1326.
66. Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC v. Converteam SAS, No. 16-00378-KD-C, 2017
WL 401951, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 2017); Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v.
Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2018).
67. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1320, 1325
(11th Cir. 2018).
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found that the Bautista test failed on the first factor since there was no
arbitration agreement in writing within the meaning of the Convention.68
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that “[p]rivate parties—here
Outokumpu and Fives—cannot contract around the Convention’s
requirement that the parties actually sign an agreement to arbitrate their
disputes in order to compel arbitration.”69 Since the Contracts were signed
by Outokumpu and Fives at a time when GE was “at most, a potential
subcontractor,” the Court found that GE was “undeniably not a signatory to
the Contracts.”70 In support of this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit
referenced its previous decision in Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate,71
where it found that an unsigned, unexecuted “sample wording” did not
satisfy the Convention’s writing requirement.72 Accordingly, it reversed
and remanded the District Court’s order compelling arbitration for further
proceedings. As noted above, GE has successfully petitioned the Supreme
Court for a Writ of Certiorari of this decision.73
III.

ANALYSIS

For both the motion to remand and the motion to compel arbitration,
the Eleventh Circuit set out to determine whether an arbitration agreement
“in writing” existed within the meaning of the Convention.74 In making
this determination, however, the Court altered its definition of “parties” for
the purpose of each motion.75 For the motion to remand, the Court defined
Outokumpu and Fives, the actual signatories of the Contracts, as the
68. Id. at 1325.
69. Id. at 1326.
70. Id.
71. 358 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2004).
72. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2018).
73. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp.
v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, No. 18-1048, 2019 WL 559565 (Feb. 7, 2019).
74. According to the Eleventh Circuit, on a motion to remand, the court is to “perform a
limited inquiry on the face of the pleadings and the removal notice to determine whether the
suit ‘relates to’ an arbitration agreement falling under the Convention.” Outokumpu
Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2018) (emphasis
added). On a motion to compel arbitration, a “more rigorous analysis” is required “to
determine whether the parties before the district court entered into an agreement under the
meaning of the Convention to arbitrate their dispute.” Id. at 1320 (emphasis added).
75. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1324–26
(11th Cir. 2018) (When determining jurisdiction on a motion to remand, “the district court
need not—and should not—examine whether the arbitration agreement binds the parties
before it.” On a motion to compel, “the district court must determine whether the parties
before the court agreed to arbitrate their dispute.”).
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“parties,” thereby easily concluding that there was an arbitration agreement
“in writing” under the Convention.76 For the purpose of the motion to
compel arbitration, in contrast, the Eleventh Circuit defined Outokumpu
and GE as the “parties,” finding that there was no “agreement in writing”
signed by GE and therefore no arbitration agreement within the meaning of
the Convention.77
In fact, the relevant “parties” for determining whether there was an
arbitration agreement “in writing” for the purpose of both motions should
have been the parties to the agreement, Outokumpu and Fives. Once the
Court concluded that there was a valid arbitration agreement between them,
the question of whether GE, as a non-signatory, has a right to invoke it
relates to the scope of the arbitration agreement,78 which should have been
determined on the basis of other applicable legal or equitable grounds.
These different definitions of “parties” employed by the Eleventh
Circuit led it to two contradictory conclusions that effectively canceled
each other out. First, the Court concluded that there was an arbitration
agreement “in writing” within the meaning of the Convention (between
Outokumpu and Fives), rendering the action (between Outokumpu and GE)
within federal jurisdiction under § 205 of the FAA.79 Second, the Court
concluded that the same action should not be referred to arbitration since
GE did not sign the arbitration agreement, and thus there was no agreement
“in writing” between Outokumpu and GE within the meaning of the
Convention.80 Of course, the same arbitration agreement cannot fall both
within and outside the Convention. Therefore, the Court’s finding that GE
had no arbitration agreement with Outokumpu within the meaning of the
Convention for the purpose of the motion to compel necessarily meant that
76. Id. at 1324 (“Because the Contracts are signed by Outokumpu and Fives, the
Contracts satisfy the first [Bautista] factor. . . . that there is an agreement in writing, that is,
an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained
in an exchange of letters or telegrams.”).
77. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1325–26
(11th Cir. 2018).
78. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1417 (2d ed. 2014)
(“In cases where there is concededly a valid agreement to arbitrate between some parties,
the question whether that agreement extends to another party is more closely akin to
determining the scope of the agreement than to determining whether any agreement has
been formed or whether an agreement is valid.”).
79. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1324–25
(11th Cir. 2018).
80. Id. at 1326–27 (“[W]e hold that, to compel arbitration, the Convention requires that
the arbitration agreement be signed by the parties before the Court or their privities. . . . [I]n
the absence of a signed agreement, Outokumpu cannot be compelled to arbitrate its dispute
with GE Energy under the Convention.”).
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the action commenced by GE fell outside the Convention and, thus, federal
jurisdiction for the purpose of the motion to remand.
This was indeed the ultimate outcome of the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision.81
The Magistrate Judge’s subsequent Report and
Recommendation found that
the [District] Court has already held—and the Eleventh Circuit
agreed—that GE Energy’s Notice of Removal adequately
pleaded that Plaintiffs’ claims, for purposes of § 205, “related to”
an arbitration agreement falling under the Convention. But, the
Eleventh Circuit also held that GE Energy could not compel
Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims because GE Energy was not a
signatory to any arbitration agreement with Outokumpu, as is
required under the Convention.82
With arbitration not being compelled, the Magistrate Judge
recommended that the action be sent back to the Alabama state court where
it was originally filed.83
Therefore, even though the Eleventh Circuit found that the action was
related to an arbitration agreement that fell within the Convention, and thus
within federal subject matter jurisdiction, its finding that GE did not have
an arbitration agreement with Outokumpu within the meaning of the
Convention ultimately led the parties back to square one. Whether this
outcome was what the Eleventh Circuit actually desired (but was reluctant
to deny federal subject matter jurisdiction over an action related to an
international commercial arbitration agreement), or it was an unintended
consequence of its bifurcated reasoning (and the Court rather intendes to
have the case heard by the federal District Court), the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision remains extremely problematic for the parties to this, and future,
international commercial arbitration cases.
Also inappropriate was the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on its previous
decision in Czarina,84 where it found that unsigned, unexecuted “sample
wording” containing an arbitration clause, which was not drafted for the
specific transaction at issue, did not satisfy the Convention’s writing

81. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. GE Energy SAS, No. 1:16-cv-00378-KD-C,
2019 WL 2158872 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 19, 2019).
82. Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at *3. This recommendation was adopted by the District Court in Outokumpu
Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, No. 16-0378-KD-C, 2019 WL 1748110 (S.D. Ala.
Apr. 18, 2019). GE has appealed this decision (Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v.
Converteam SAS, No. 19-11930 (11th Cir. May 17, 2019).
84. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2018).
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requirement.85 While GE did not sign the Contracts itself, it is undisputed
that they were negotiated and signed by Outokumpu. Outokumpu therefore
agreed to arbitration, and the only question remaining is with whom. These
facts are therefore very different from the unsigned “sample wording” at
issue in the Czarina case.86
Moreover, the Czarina decision concerned a motion to confirm an
arbitration award, rather than a motion to compel an arbitration
agreement.87 In a motion to compel an arbitration agreement, “the most
preferable course of action is to refer the parties to arbitration.”88 In a
motion to confirm an arbitration award, courts retain the ability to “review
the arbitral panel’s decision regarding the incorporation of a non-signatory
to the arbitration at the stage of setting aside or enforcement of the award”
pursuant to Article V of the Convention.89 Indeed, where a respondent
relies on this ground to argue against recognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award, “this issue is decided by the court by re-assessing the facts

85. Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2004). In this
case, an Israeli company entered into an agreement with defendant, a Florida reinsurance
company, under which defendant agreed to reinsure some of its risks. Defendant’s lead
underwriters were to draft a written contract, but they never did. Nonetheless, the Israeli
company maintained that defendant “was indebted to it under this reinsurance agreement.”
Id. at 1289. The Israeli company later “became insolvent and was liquidated. In the
liquidation, [plaintiff] purchased some of [its] accounts receivable, including the
[defendant’s] account. After [defendant] refused to pay [plaintiff] on that account,
[plaintiff] initiated an arbitration in London. . . . [Plaintiff] asserted that arbitration was the
proper forum for deciding its dispute with” defendant on the basis of several documents,
including “sample wording” that the Israeli company had used in its reinsurance
relationships. Id.
86. Czarina has indeed been interpreted as holding that “the arbitration agreement was
invalid not merely because it was unsigned, but because it was only a sample wording that
was not shown to have been adopted by the contesting party.” See TransAsia Lawyers v.
EcoNova, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-98 DN, 2014 WL 2112442, at *6 (D. Utah May 20, 2014); see
also China Nat’l Chem. Constr. Chongqing Co. v. Seedling, No. CV-05-350-ST, 2006 WL
8449845, at *10 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2006) (distinguishing Czarina from the case before it since
“petitioners have submitted a written agreement with an arbitration clause,” and finding that
clause enforceable against the non-signatory party). In Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 404
F.3d 657, 660 n.2, 663 (2d Cir. 2005), the Court of Appeals held that “[t]o the extent the
facts and holding of Czarina are not distinguishable, we reject its holding.”
87. This is also why this decision is not included in the next section, which examines
previous Courts of Appeals decisions on the signature requirement.
88. INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICCA’S GUIDE TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 60
(2011), https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/13365477041670/judges_guide_english_c
omposite_final_revised_may_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPR6-P5AB] (last visited Feb. 23,
2020).
89. Id.
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of the case, independent of the decision reached by the arbitrators.”90 This
was also recognized by the Supreme Court, holding that
the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity
at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that . . . legitimate
interest[s] . . . ha[ve] been addressed. The Convention reserves
to each signatory country the right to refuse enforcement of an
award where the “recognition or enforcement of the award would
be contrary to the public policy of that country.”91
In sum, the decision of the Eleventh Circuit presents a rather
confused, and confusing, analysis of the Convention’s “in writing”
requirement and its application to non-signatories to international
commercial arbitration agreements. The Court’s interpretation of this
requirement as restricting arbitration to “the specific parties to an
agreement” effectively excludes from arbitration any party that has not
“actually signed” the arbitration agreement.92 As will become evident from
the review of other U.S. federal courts’ decisions and of international
principles and practice in the following sections, this position flies in the
face of the widely accepted liberal interpretation of this requirement, which
clearly allows for international commercial arbitration agreements to attach
rights and obligations to non-signatories in certain circumstances.
IV.

THE “IN WRITING” REQUIREMENT: A REVIEW OF U.S.
FEDERAL COURTS JURISPRUDENCE

Chapter One of the FAA provides in part that
[a] written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.93
This has largely been interpreted to mean that a contract need not be signed
in order for its arbitration clause to be enforceable, as non-signatories may
be bound to, or benefit from, arbitration agreements they did not sign based
on various legal or equitable doctrines.94 Chapter Two of the FAA governs
90. Id. at 86.
91. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638
(1985).
92. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2018).
93. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
94. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 624 (2009) (holding that
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how U.S. courts treat international commercial arbitration agreements
falling under the Convention. Actions or proceedings concerning such
agreements shall be heard by district courts,95 who may refer them to

“traditional state-law principles allow enforcement of contracts by (or against) nonparties
through, e.g., assumption or third-party beneficiary theories”); Interocean Shipping Co. v.
Nat’l Shipping & Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 539 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that “the mere
fact that a party did not sign an arbitration agreement does not mean that it cannot be held
bound by it. Ordinary contract principles determine who is bound.”); Thomson-CSF, S.A. v.
Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that “a nonsignatory party
may be bound to an arbitration agreement if so dictated by the ‘ordinary principles of
contract and agency,’” including “1) incorporation by reference; 2) assumption; 3) agency;
4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and 5) estoppel”); McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 356 (1st Cir.
1994) (holding that “a person signing a contract only in a corporate capacity, and
unambiguously indicating that fact on the face of the contract documents, does not thereby
become a party to the agreement,” and examining “contract and agency principles” in order
to determine if the agent should nonetheless be considered as a party to the arbitration
agreement even though he did not sign the agreement in his individual capacity); Arnold v.
Arnold Corp.–Printed Commc’ns for Bus., 920 F.2d 1269 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
individual defendants were entitled to arbitration as agents of signatory corporate defendant,
even though they had not signed the arbitration agreement); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 194–95 (3d Cir. 2001)
(noting that “when asked to enforce an arbitration agreement against a non-signatory to an
arbitration clause, we ask ‘whether he or she is bound by that agreement under traditional
principles of contract and agency law.’ . . . [T]hird party beneficiary, agency/principal, and
equitable estoppel, [are] recognized principle[s] of contract or agency law applicable in the
arbitration context”); Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that “nonsignatories of arbitration agreements may be bound by the agreement under
ordinary contract and agency principles”); Lawson v. Life of the S. Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 1166,
1170 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that “‘traditional principles of state law’ may allow ‘a
contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract through assumption, piercing
the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories,
waiver and estoppel’”); Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Berm.) Ltd., 601 F.3d 329,
333 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Carlisle that “nonsignatories
to arbitration agreements (such as direct action plaintiffs) may sometimes be compelled to
arbitrate”).
95. See 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2018) (“An action or proceeding falling under the Convention
shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts
of the United States . . . shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding,
regardless of the amount in controversy.”); see also 9 U.S.C. § 205 (2018) (“Where the
subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court relates to an arbitration
agreement or award falling under the Convention, the defendant or the defendants may, at
any time before the trial thereof, remove such action or proceeding to the district court of
the United States for the district and division embracing the place where the action or
proceeding is pending. The procedure for removal of causes otherwise provided by law
shall apply, except that the ground for removal provided in this section need not appear on
the face of the complaint but may be shown in the petition for removal. For the purposes of
Chapter 1 of this title any action or proceeding removed under this section shall be deemed
to have been brought in the district court to which it is removed.”).
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arbitration.96 An international arbitration agreement “falling under the
Convention” is defined in §202 as one “arising out of a legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a
transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title,” i.e.,
in Chapter One.97
A general agreement among Circuit Courts of Appeals has developed
that “[a] court presented with a request to refer a dispute to arbitration
pursuant to Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act performs a very
limited inquiry. It must resolve four preliminary questions: [the first of
which being whether] there is an agreement in writing to arbitrate” within
the meaning of Article II of the Convention.98 The consensus seems to end
here, however, as Courts of Appeals remain split on the meaning of this “in
writing” requirement in the context of motions to compel international
commercial arbitration agreements by or against non-signatories. Some
courts, such as the Eleventh Circuit in Outokumpu v. GE, seem to require
an actual signature in order to compel a party to arbitrate, while others
recognize the applicability of various legal or equitable doctrines to
determine this question.99
Most U.S. federal courts have interpreted the “in writing” requirement
of the Convention liberally, and therefore have not insisted on a strict
signature requirement. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (“First
Circuit”) has found that “[a] non-signatory may be bound by or acquire
rights under an arbitration agreement under ordinary state-law principles of
agency or contract.”100 The First Circuit has accordingly held, for instance,
that a signatory to an international arbitration agreement may be equitably
estopped from avoiding arbitration of a dispute with a non-signatory that
involves issues intertwined with a contract between signatories.101
96. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (2018) (“A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct
that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided for,
whether that place is within or without the United States. Such court may also appoint
arbitrators in accordance with the provisions of the agreement.”).
97. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2018).
98. Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186–87 (1st Cir. 1982); see, e.g., Sedco,
Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat’l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1144–45 (5th Cir.
1985); Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186–87 (1st Cir. 1982); Smith/Enron
Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999);
Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005).
99. The following survey is not intended to be exhaustive of all federal courts’
decisions on this issue, but rather aims to discuss a representative sample of such decisions
in order to illustrate the split in the courts’ positions.
100. Restoration Pres. Masonry, Inc. v. Grove Europe Ltd., 325 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir.
2003).
101. Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008).
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Equitable principles were similarly applied by the First Circuit to determine
the ability of a non-signatory company to assert that it was not a party to an
international arbitration agreement since it had not embraced or sought to
derive benefits from the contract.102
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (“Fourth Circuit”) has
also held that “a party can agree to submit to arbitration by means other
than personally signing a contract containing an arbitration clause,” and
thus “in an appropriate case a nonsignatory can enforce, or be bound by, an
arbitration provision within a contract executed by other parties.”103
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit has found that “a nonsignatory parent
company may arbitrate a claim if its subsidiary is a signatory to an
arbitration agreement and the charges against the parent and subsidiary
involve inherently inseparable facts.”104 The Fourth Circuit has also relied
on “common law principles of contract interpretation” in finding that
contracts containing an international arbitration agreement applied to a
non-signatory since they concerned the same subject matter as contracts
signed by that party, “and were executed by the same parties within one
day of each other.”105 At least one District Court located in this Circuit has
noted that
[E]ven where a party has not personally signed a contract
containing an arbitration clause, other circumstances may still
permit such a party to “enforce, or to be bound by, an arbitration
provision within a contract executed by other parties.” . . . This
enforcement rests, not on the terms of the contract itself, but
rather upon the theory of equitable estoppel.106
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (“Fifth Circuit”) has
similarly noted that “in both FAA and Convention cases, courts have
largely relied on the same common law contract and agency principles to
determine whether nonsignatories must arbitrate.”107 Therefore, “cases
discussing whether nonsignatories can be compelled to arbitrate under the

102. InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003).
103. Int’l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411,
416–17 (4th Cir. 2000).
104. Silkworm Screen Printers, Inc. v. Abrams, No. 91-1631, 1992 WL 317187, at *5
(4th Cir. Nov. 4, 1992).
105. Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355, 368 (4th Cir. 2012).
106. DP Sols., Inc. v. Help Desk Now, Inc., No. 1:08 CV 104, 2008 WL 4543785, at *3
(M.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2008) (finding ultimately that the theory was inapplicable on the facts
before it).
107. Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Berm.) Ltd., 601 F.3d 329, 333–34 (5th Cir.
2010).
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FAA are relevant for this case governed by the New York Convention.”108
The Fifth Circuit has also found that “‘background principles’ of state
contract law, when relevant ‘allow a contract to be enforced by or against
nonparties to the contract through assumption, piercing the corporate veil,
alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories,
waiver and estoppel.’”109 The Court accordingly considered, albeit rejected
on the facts, a non-signatory defendant’s estoppel argument in one case,110
and in another case it upheld the district court’s decision to “not require
that the contract containing an arbitral provision be signed to constitute an
agreement in writing under the Convention.”111 District courts located in
this Circuit have agreed, noting that “[t]he question of whether a nonsignatory can be bound to arbitrate is a procedural one,” and finding that
under both federal and state law the “direct-benefits estoppel theory” can
be applied “when enforcing arbitration agreements against nonsignatories.”112 Accordingly, a defendant “need not show that it has the
right to enforce the arbitration agreement. It is enough that ‘in certain
limited instances, pursuant to an equitable estoppel doctrine, a
nonsignatory-to-an-arbitration-agreement-defendant
can
nevertheless
compel arbitration against a signatory-plaintiff.’”113
In the same vein, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held in
one case involving non-signatory plaintiffs that “[a]lthough plaintiffs were
not parties to the contract . . . , if they are going to try to enforce it, they are
subject to its terms and to the international law governing its terms,”
including arbitration.114 A district court located in this Circuit, when called
108. Id. at 335. The Court remanded the case back to the District Court, which had
originally denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration. On remand, the District Court
found that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and granted the motion to compel.
Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n, Ltd., No. 08-1195, 2011 WL 1226464, at *7 (E.D.
La. Mar. 28, 2011).
109. Brittania-U Nigeria, Ltd. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 866 F.3d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 2017).
110. Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 1997).
111. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 669–70 (5th Cir.
1994). The Court interpreted the “signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of
letters or telegrams” qualifier in Article II(2) of the Convention as applying only to “an
arbitration agreement” and not to “an arbitral clause in a contract,” as in this case. Id. at
699.
112. Authenment v. Ingram Barge Co., 878 F.Supp.2d 672, 680–81 (E.D. La. 2012).
113. QPro Inc. v. RTD Quality Servs. USA, Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 817, 824 (S.D. Tex.
2010).
114. Aasma v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n, Inc., 95 F.3d 400, 405 (6th
Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs in this case were “a group of merchant mariners who claim injury
resulting from exposure to asbestos during their service aboard ships” whose owner was
insured by the defendant. Id. at 402. The insurance policies, to which plaintiffs were not
signatories, contained arbitration clauses. Id. at 405.
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upon to decide whether the non-signatory defendant was a party to the
international arbitration agreement, noted that the “Sixth Circuit has
recognized five theories for binding nonsignatories to arbitration
agreements: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4)
veil-piercing/alter-ego; and (5) estoppel.”115 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has also noted that “[w]e see no reason why, even in the
absence of a writing, ordinary rules of contract law should not apply.”116
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit has accepted in
principle that “when contract law principles demonstrate the existence of
an arbitration agreement between the parties, courts will find that Article II
is satisfied and that subject matter jurisdiction is proper,” even absent a
signature.117 The same reasoning was adopted by the Court of Appeals for
the Eight Circuit (“Eight Circuit”), finding that “a willing signatory seeking
to arbitrate with a non-signatory that is unwilling must establish at least one
of . . . [these] five theories[:]
(1) incorporation by reference; (2)
assumption; (3) agency; (4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and (5) estoppel.”118
The Eight Circuit has also upheld a district court’s decision recognizing,
yet finding inapplicable on the facts, the “common law third party
beneficiary” theory as grounds for binding a non-signatory to an
international arbitration clause.119 However, not all district courts in this
Circuit have followed suit. One such court has found that since the
defendant before it did not sign the contract containing the arbitration
agreement and there was no “exchange of letters or telegrams,” there was
no enforceable arbitration agreement under the Convention.120
Rounding up the discussion of those U.S. federal courts that have
largely adopted a liberal interpretation of the Convention’s “in writing”
115. Rossisa Participações S.A. & Cia. Rossi De Automóveis v. Reynolds & Reynolds
Co., 2019 WL 4242937, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 6, 2019) (concerning a Petition to Confirm
Arbitration Award pursuant to the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, which is enforced in the U.S. in accordance with Chapter Three of the FAA, 9
U.S.C.A. §§ 301–307 (2018)).
116. Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 591 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing
with approval the Second Circuit in Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship v. Smith
Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999), where the Second Circuit held that
“non-signatories to an arbitration agreement may nevertheless be bound according to
ordinary principles of contract and agency, including estoppel”).
117. Dynamo v. Ovechkin, 412 F.Supp.2d 24, 27–28 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding the
arbitration agreement to be inapplicable to the non-signatory party since he had not
“expressed his affirmative acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate”).
118. Reid v. Doe Run Res. Corp., 701 F.3d 840, 846 (8th Cir. 2012).
119. Recold, S.A. de C.V. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 893 F.2d 195, 197 (8th Cir.
1990).
120. Seaboard Corp. v. Grindrod Ltd., 248 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
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requirement and its application to non-signatories are the district courts
located in the Tenth Circuit. One such court has noted that “[a]lthough
Article II, paragraph 2 of the Convention states that the agreement should
be signed or contained in an exchange of letters, courts have repeatedly
held that non-signatories to an arbitration agreement ‘may nevertheless be
bound according to ordinary principles of contract and agency.’”121
Moreover, “the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(‘UNCITRAL’) has recommended that ‘[A]rticle II, paragraph 2, of the
[New York Convention] be applied recognizing that the circumstances
described therein are not exhaustive.’”122 Therefore, “[g]eneral contract
principles can validate an unsigned agreement to arbitrate.”123
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (“Second
Circuit”) has been inconsistent in its approach to the signature requirement.
Early on, it did not apply such a requirement to international commercial
arbitration agreements falling under the Convention, even where the
applicable state law included a signature requirement.124 The Court further
found that some
state statutes . . . directly clash with the Convention and with the
Arbitration Act because they effectively reincarnate the former
judicial hostility towards arbitration. Accordingly, we hold that
the Convention and the Arbitration Act preempt the [state]
statute, and that the . . . arbitration provisions, as drafted, are
enforceable.125

121. TransAsia Lawyers v. EcoNova, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-98 DN, 2014 WL 2112442, at *6
(D. Utah May 20, 2014).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. David L. Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd. (London), 923 F.2d 245,
250 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Because federal arbitration law governs this dispute, we must
determine whether the Vermont statute is sufficiently consistent with federal law that the
two may peacefully coexist. Article II, Section 1 of the Convention requires only that the
agreement to arbitrate be in writing; this standard obviously is less rigid than that required
by the Vermont statute.”); see also Beromun Aktiengesellschaft v. Societa Industriale
Agricola “Tresse” Di Dr. Domenico e Dr. Antonio Dal Ferro, 471 F.Supp. 1163, 1170
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[W]ritten agreement for arbitration is the Sine qua non of an enforceable
arbitration agreement,” but that such agreement “need not be signed, however, and ordinary
contract principles dictate when the parties are bound by a written arbitration provision
absent their signatures.”).
125. David L. Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd. (London), 923 F.2d 245,
250 (2d Cir. 1991). The arbitration agreement was contained in the “parties’ basic trading
agreements[,] which incorporated London metal exchange rule providing for arbitration of
disputes ‘arising out of or in relation to’ contracts for metals.” Id. at 246. The suit was
brought for alleged breach of a separate trader’s agreement between the parties. Id.
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In another early case, the Second Circuit explicitly stated that “it is
well-established that a party may be bound by an agreement to arbitrate
even absent a signature. Further, while the Act requires a writing, it does
not require that the writing be signed by the parties.”126
However, a few years later the Second Circuit seemed no longer
willing to apply international commercial arbitration agreements to nonsignatories. It found,127 on the basis of an elaborate grammatical analysis
of Article II of the Convention, that “in order to be enforceable under the
Convention, both an arbitral clause in a contract and an arbitration
agreement must be signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of
letters or telegrams.”128 Since the contract containing the arbitration clause
in that case was only signed by one of the parties and was not contained in
an exchange of letters or telegrams, the Court concluded that there was “no
‘agreement in writing’ sufficient to bring this dispute within the scope of
the Convention.”129 In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit
recognized its own previous ruling that “the Convention ‘should be
interpreted broadly to effectuate its recognition and enforcement
purposes,’”130 but did not explain how its decision is to be reconciled with
126. Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., Ltd., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987) (citation
omitted); see also, Borsack v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Ltd., 974 F.Supp. 293, 299–
300 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that “[o]ur Court of Appeals has rejected the proposition that
only signatories to an arbitration agreement can be bound by its terms, applying instead
ordinary principles of contract and agency to determine which parties are bound by an
agreement to arbitrate,” and that “[u]nder general contract principles, ‘non-signatories [] fall
within the scope of an arbitration agreement where that is the intent of the parties’”);
Overseas Cosmos, Inc. v. NR Vessel Corp., No. 97 CIV. 5898(DC), 1997 WL 757041, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“While Article II of the Convention indeed requires that an agreement to
arbitrate be in writing to be enforceable, ‘it does not require that the writing be signed by the
parties,’ . . . and ‘ordinary contract principles dictate when the parties are bound by a written
arbitration provision absent their signatures.’”).
127. Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 217–18 (2d Cir. 1999).
Nonetheless, federal District Courts in the Circuit remained split on the issue. Compare
Siderugica Del Orinoco (Sidor), C.A. v. Linea Naviera De Cabotaje, C.A., No. 99 CIV.
0075(TPG), 1999 WL 632870, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating, with respect to an
international arbitration agreement falling under Chapter Three of the FAA, 9 U.S.C.A. §§
301–307, which implements the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, that “the writing required under the FAA need not be signed and that ordinary
contract principles dictate when parties are bound by a written arbitration provision absent
their signatures”) with Sen Mar, Inc. v. Tiger Petroleum Corp., 774 F.Supp. 879, 882–83
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (featuring an arbitration clause that was contained in a telex, which could
not be enforced since “[i]t is not found in a signed writing nor is it found in an exchange of
letters”).
128. Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 217 (2d Cir. 1999).
129. Id. at 217–18.
130. Id. at 218 (citing Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 933 (2d Cir.
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its previous decisions concerning the signature requirement. The Court
did, however, expressly reject the liberal approach to this requirement
adopted by the Fifth Circuit.131
Nonetheless, in a decision rendered a mere six months later, the
Second Circuit once again acknowledged the applicability of various
doctrines, including incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, veilpiercing/alter ego, and estoppel, to determine whether an international
commercial arbitration agreement should be applied to non-signatories.132
The Court appears to have maintained this position, dispensing with the
strict signature requirement, in subsequent cases.133
1983)).
131. Id. (finding that “the rules governing our construction do not allow us to follow the
Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of article II, section 2 as expressed in Sphere Drake”).
132. Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198 F.3d
88, 97 (2d Cir. 1999).
133. See, e.g., Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311
F.3d 488, 495 (2d Cir. 2002) (“We have recognized certain theories under which a nonsignatory party may be bound by an arbitration agreement and thus subject to the
jurisdiction of the court in proceedings to compel arbitration. . . .”); U.S. Titan, Inc. v.
Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 241 F.3d 135, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (“An agreement to
arbitrate exists within the meaning of the Convention and the FAA if: (1) there is a written
agreement; (2) the writing provides for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the
convention; (3) the subject matter is commercial; and (4) the subject matter is not entirely
domestic in scope.”).
Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 2005), has been viewed as abrogating
Kahn Lucas. “[T]he Kahn Lucas court assumed the dispositive question was one of subject
matter jurisdiction without addressing the distinction between determining whether subject
matter jurisdiction existed and determining—on the merits—whether the parties had made
an agreement to arbitrate. . . . [T]o the extent that Kahn Lucas is read as viewing an element
of a claim as a jurisdictional requisite, the absence of which deprives the Court of subject
matter jurisdiction, it is contrary to prior holdings of this Court.” Id. at 660 n.2. See also
Sea Bowld Marine Grp., LDC v. Oceanfast Pty, Ltd, 432 F.Supp.2d 1305, 1313 (S.D. Fla.
2006) (stating that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated that the
‘lack of a written arbitration agreement is not an impediment to arbitration’”); Alghanim v.
Alghanim, 828 F.Supp.2d 636, 647–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that “[p]ursuant to federal
law, in the particular context of the Convention, the fact that non-signatories did not sign a
written arbitration agreement ‘does not foreclose the application of the well-established
contract and agency principles under which nonsignatories sometimes can be obligated by,
or benefit from agreements signed by others’”).
The Kahn Lucas decision has given rise to some interesting reasoning by District Courts
seeking to avoid its harsh outcome. The decision was distinguished, for instance, in
Glencore Ltd. v. Degussa Engineered Carbons L.P., 848 F.Supp.2d 410, 437 (S.D.N.Y.
2012), where the Court found that the case before it “involve[d] an entirely different level of
interchange between the parties than present in Kahn Lucas Lancaster, and compelling
evidence of a meeting of the minds between the parties on the terms set forth in the contract
incorporating the arbitration clause.” The Court therefore concluded “comfortably, that the
parties’ written back-and-forth . . . satisfies the requirement of an arbitral clause ‘contained
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The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (“Third Circuit”) has been
similarly inconsistent in its approach to the Convention’s signature
requirement. Early on, the Court held that “[w]hen asked to enforce an
arbitration agreement against a nonsignatory, we ask whether he or she is
bound by that agreement under traditional principles of contract and agency
law.”134 “In keeping with the federal policy favoring arbitration,” the
Court, for instance, “extend[ed] the scope of [international commercial]
arbitration clauses to agents of the party who signed the agreements.”135
However, the Third Circuit’s position gradually changed, as a few years
later it found that “the plain language [of the Convention] provides that an
arbitration clause is enforceable only if it was contained in a signed writing
or an exchange of letters.”136 The Third Circuit shifted yet again more
recently, finding, for instance, that “arbitration provisions, like other
contractual provisions, may be incorporated by reference through general
incorporation provisions,” specifically recognizing such “incorporation by
reference as one theory for binding nonsignatories to arbitration
agreements.”137 The Court has further recognized that “[t]here are five
in an exchange of letters and telegrams’ within the meaning of the Convention.” Id. In
Dedon GmbH v. Janus et Cie, No. 10 Civ. 04541 (CM), 2011 WL 666174, at *1, *3–4
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), the District Court was faced with a claim for tortious interference while
the dispute was being heard in ICC arbitration in London. The Court first found that “Kahn
Lucas’ holding precluding enforcement of an unsigned arbitration agreement pursuant to the
New York Convention survives Sarhank and remains good law.” Id. at *3. Therefore, had
the defendant to the unsigned arbitration agreement sought to compel arbitration, “Kahn
Lucas would require this Court to deny the motion with prejudice, since there is no dispute
that there is neither a signed agreement containing an arbitration clause nor any exchange of
letters or telegrams between the parties.” Id. However, the District Court also found that
“there is a distinction between the existence of a contract and its enforceability.” Id. at *1.
Accordingly, it held that “Kahn says nothing at all about whether an arbitration agreement
exists; it holds only that an agreement to arbitrate must be signed to be enforceable under
the New York Convention, which has as its limited purpose the establishment of criteria for
conferring authority on United States courts to compel arbitration (and enforce awards)
under international arbitration agreements.” Id. at *3. Since “Kahn does not hold that no
arbitration agreement can come into being absent a signature . . . it is possible that the
parties concluded a valid and binding agreement to arbitrate under whatever contract law
governs their dealings . . . Kahn does not obviate the need for the trial on the issue of
contract formation.” Id. at *1, *3–4.
134. Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999).
135. Id. (quoting Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110,
1122 (3d Cir. 1993)).
136. Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003); see
also Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 101 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that the act
bringing the arbitration clause into effect was “the signing of the agreement”).
137. Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, Subscribing to
Retrocessional Agreement Nos. 950548, 950549, 950646, 584 F.3d 513, 532 (3d Cir. 2009).
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theories for binding nonsignatories to arbitration agreements under the
Convention: (1) incorporation by reference, (2) assumption, (3) agency, (4)
veil-piercing/alter ego, and (5) estoppel.”138
Two Courts of Appeals seem to have pivoted in the opposite direction,
and now require a signature to evidence consent to arbitrate. Up until
recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) was
willing to apply international commercial arbitration agreements to nonsignatories in certain circumstances, on the basis of “ordinary contract and
agency principles.”139 The Court now seems to have changed its position,
138. Invista S.À.R.L. v. Rhodia, S.A., 625 F.3d 75, 84 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Quanqing
(Changshu) Cloth-Making Co. v. Pilgrim Worldwide Trading, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-03785,
2010 WL 2674589, at *3 (D.N.J. 2010) (finding, on the basis of Century Indem., that a
“non-signatory to a contract [can] be estopped from denying obligations under a contract,
including a provision providing for the arbitration of disputes,” in certain circumstances).
139. See Balen v. Holland Am. Line Inc., 583 F.3d 647, 655 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding, on
the basis of “ordinary contract and agency principles,” that the agent signing the arbitration
agreement on behalf of the defendant non-signatory rendered the latter a party to it);
Wimbledon Fin. Master Fund, Ltd. v. Molner, 578 F. App’x 691, 692 (9th Cir. 2014)
(recognizing that “‘nonsignatories of arbitration agreements’ [are] bound by such
agreements to the extent ‘ordinary contract and agency principles’ would bind them,” and
finding that “[d]efendants have not alleged a contract or agency theory to bind Plaintiffs to
the terms of an arbitration agreement they did not sign”). See also Prograph Int’l Inc. v.
Barhydt, 928 F.Supp. 983, 990 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Agency principles have been held to
permit nonsignatory corporations to compel arbitration under arbitration clauses signed by
their corporate parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates, at least when the allegations against the
nonsignatory corporation do not differ substantially from those against its signatory
affiliate.”); China Na’l Chem. Constr. Chongqing Co. v. Seedling, No. CV-05-350-ST, 2006
WL 8449845, at *10 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2006) (finding that submitting “a written agreement
with an arbitration clause . . . satisfies the procedural requirements of Article II. The issue is
whether [the] non-signator to the agreement, is bound by that arbitration clause. Even if he
did not sign the agreement with the arbitration clause, he may still be bound by an
arbitration agreement arising out of common law principles of contract and agency law,
such as incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, piercing the corporate veil/alter
ego, and estoppel.”); Greenberg v. Park Indem. Ltd., No. LA CV12-10756 JAK (AJWx),
2013 WL 12123695, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2013) (finding that an arbitration clause in an
insurance policy was enforceable even absent the plaintiff’s signature, and reconciling
Sphere Drake and Kahn Lucas by holding that “although Kahn Lucas determined that the
purchase order and confirmation of order forms did not satisfy the signature requirement, it
did not address what would constitute evidence of an agreement sufficient to satisfy the
Convention.” The Court further found equitable estoppel applicable as ground for finding
the non-signatory to be bound by the arbitration agreement in this case); Chloe Z Fishing
Co., Inc. v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F.Supp.2d 1236, 1246–49 (S.D. Cal. 2000)
(finding that “Article II of the Convention exhaustively defines what constitutes an
‘agreement in writing’” and that “both an arbitral clause and an agreement in writing must
be found either in a signed writing or an exchange of letters under the Convention.” The
District Court did, however, broadly interpret “an exchange of letters,” finding that the
“conduct of the parties in negotiating the [insurance] policies affirmatively manifests their
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however,140 interpreting the Convention to mean that “only a ‘party’ or
‘parties to the agreement referred to in article II’ may litigate its
enforcement.”141 The Ninth Circuit has reasoned that “Article II makes
clear that arbitration is permissible only where there is ‘an agreement in
writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them’—not
disputes between a party and a non-party.”142 The Court therefore
concluded that “the Convention Treaty does not allow non-signatories or
non-parties to compel arbitration.”143
consent to the arbitral clauses within the meaning of the ‘exchange of letters or telegrams’
requirement under the Convention.” Moreover, the Court found that “the import of the
parties’ conduct must be construed in accordance with English law,” rather than federal law,
since “the manifestation of assent here occurred in London.”).
140. Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff in
this case was the widow of a seaman “who died when the fishing vessel he worked on sank
because of inadequate repairs and an incompetent crew provided by [defendant]. [She]
commenced a wrongful death action. . . . [[D]efendant] moved to compel arbitration based
on an employment agreement between [the deceased] and the vessel’s owner. Defendant
was owned by the same family who owned the vessel. The agreement, which contained an
arbitration clause, was signed by defendant “on behalf of” the vessel’s owner.” Id. at 998.
“The District Court compelled arbitration of the claims against [the vessel’s owner], but
denied the motion as to [defendant].” Id. Defendant appealed, arguing that the “‘signed by
the parties’ requirement in Article II(2) applies only to ‘an arbitration agreement’ and not
‘an arbitral clause in a contract.’” Id. at 999. See also Setty v. Shrinivas Sugandhalaya
LLP, 771 F. App’x 456 (9th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff and his company, located in Bangalore,
sued defendant company, owned by his brother and located in Mumbai, for trademark
infringement. Defendant moved to compel arbitration on the basis of an arbitration clause
contained in a partnership deed signed between the brothers prior to the incorporation of
their respective companies. Setty v. Shrinivas Sugandhalaya LLP, No. 2:17-cv-01146-RAJ,
2018 WL 3064778 (W.D. Wash. June 21, 2018). The District Court denied the motion and
defendant appealed. Relying on Yang, the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that since
defendant was not a signatory to the Partnership Deed, and was not even in existence at the
time the Partnership Deed was signed, it may not compel arbitration under the New York
Convention. Setty v. Shrinivas Sugandhalaya LLP, 771 F. App’x 456, 456–57 (9th Cir.
2019).
141. Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2017).
142. Id.
143. Id. The Court noted that the widow of a second seaman who died in the accident,
who was “[u]nencumbered by an arbitration clause . . . successfully litigated her claims,
obtaining a $3.2 million judgment that we affirmed on appeal.” Id. at 998. The Court of
Appeals’ decision in Yang has been followed by lower courts in the Circuit and interpreted
as holding that “arbitration agreements arising under the Convention are enforceable only by
a party who is a signatory to the agreement under which it moves to compel. . . .
Moreover, . . . a litigant may not circumvent the Convention’s requirements under the state
law exceptions of equitable estoppel, agency, or alter ego.” Youssefzadeh v. Global-IP
Cayman, No. 2:18-cv-02522-JLS-JCG, 2018 WL 6118436, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2018).
However, Yang was distinguished in STM Atl. N.V. v. Dong Yin Dev. Holdings Ltd., No.
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The trajectory of the Eleventh Circuit in this regard is similar to that
of the Ninth. Up until its recent decision in Outokumpu v. GE discussed
above, the Court largely applied international commercial arbitration
agreements to non-signatories on grounds similar to those referenced by
sister Circuits.144 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit found that nonsignatory defendants could invoke an arbitration clause “in the light of their
close relationship to the parties to the agreement.”145 Similarly, the Court
applied equitable estoppel to require a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate a
claim against a non-signatory defendant where that claim was “inextricably
intertwined” with its claim against a signatory defendant.146 Finally, in
several decisions the Court allowed for the application of an unsigned
international commercial arbitration agreement incorporated by reference

2:18-cv-01269-JLS-JCG, 2019 WL 2417625, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2019). The case
involved a motion by defendant non-signatory to stay the litigation pending arbitration on
the basis of equitable estoppel. The Court recognized that Yang “rejected a non-signatory’s
attempt to compel arbitration under a theory of equitable estoppel,” but found that Yang
“precludes only the remedy of actual arbitration. Nothing in Yang suggests that alternative
equitable relief, such as a stay, runs afoul of the Convention.” Id.
144. The position of the Court on this issue in Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289,
1300 (11th Cir. 2005) is not entirely clear. The Court noted “the jurisdictional prerequisite
that the court be provided with an agreement to arbitrate signed by the parties,” however it
did not express a position on whether or not consent could also be ascertained by other
means since the parties in the case did in fact sign the document containing the arbitration
clause. Id. For a strict interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit’s decisions on the signatory
requirement, see NCL (Bah.) Ltd. v. ABB Ltd., No. 05-21796-CIV-LENARD/GARBER,
2008 WL 11400755, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2008) (holding that “[b]ased on the Eleventh
Circuit’s decisions regarding the ‘agreement in writing’ jurisdictional prerequisite, it is
apparent that both parties must be signatories to the arbitration agreement in order for a
district court to have subject matter jurisdiction.” The Court further found that “[t]he plain
reading of Article II, Section 2 is that, to be considered an ‘agreement in writing’ governed
by the Convention, the arbitration agreement or contract containing an arbitral clause must
be signed by ‘the parties.’ While the Convention does not specify who ‘the parties’ are, the
most logical inference is that the Convention is referring to the parties to the subsequent
litigation.”).
145. Olsher Metals Corp. v. Olsher, No. 03-12184, 2004 WL 5394012, at *3 (11th Cir.
Jan. 26, 2004).
146. Escobal v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 482 F. App’x 475, 476 (11th Cir.
2012). See also B & B Jewelry, Inc. v. Pandora Jewelry LLC, 247 F.Supp.3d 1283, 1287 n.1
(S.D. Fla. 2017) (noting that in order to enforce arbitration provisions “against nonsignatories under the doctrines of equitable estoppel, agency, and third-party beneficiary
principles . . . under well-established Eleventh Circuit precedent, the claims against the nonsignatories must be ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the claims against the signatory”);
Pineda v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 283 F.Supp.3d 1307, 1310–11 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (finding that
“equitable estoppel is available to allow a nonsignatory to compel arbitration,” although the
conditions for its application were not satisfied in that case).
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into the contract signed by the parties.147 The Eleventh Circuit did not
address any of these decisions in Outokumpu v. GE. Instead, it relied on a
2017 decision of the Ninth Circuit148 and older decisions of the Second
Circuit149 and Third Circuit,150 even though the latter Courts of Appeals
have moved away from this rigid position since these decisions were
rendered twenty-one and seventeen years ago, respectively. Nonetheless,
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Outokumpu v. GE has now been followed
by lower courts and interpreted as “unequivocally determin[ing] that nonsignatories cannot be bound to arbitration agreements under the Convention
under theories of estoppel or third party beneficiary.”151
As part of its justification for imposing a strict signature requirement,
the Eleventh Circuit in Outokumpu v. GE found there to be a conflict
between the Convention and the FAA.152 This so-called conflict arises,
according to the Court, since Chapter One of the FAA does not require that
the parties sign the arbitration agreement, while “the Convention, as
codified in Chapter 2 of the FAA, only allows the enforcement of
agreements in writing signed by the parties.”153 Since Congress “has
specified that the Convention trumps Chapter 1 of the FAA where the two
are in conflict,”154 the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the Convention’s
“signature requirement” prevails. However, as the next section will
illustrate, there is no conflict between the Convention and the FAA in this
147. See, e.g., Vera v. Cruise Ships Catering & Servs. Int’l, N.V., 594 F. App’x 963
(11th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1214–15 (11th Cir.
2011).
148. Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2017).
149. Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1999).
150. Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440 (3d Cir. 2003).
151. See, e.g., McCullough v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 16-cv-20194GAYLES, 2019 WL 2076192, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 2019). The District Court noted that the
Court of Appeals’ “explicit language severely restricts any attempt to bind a non-signatory
through theories of equity,” and concluded that “because there is no agreement signed by
both parties, the [plaintiffs] cannot be compelled to arbitrate.” The plaintiffs have filed an
appeal (Notice of Appeal, McCullough v. AIG Ins. Hong Kong, Ltd., 2019 WL 2076192
(May 30, 2019) (No. 19-12100). But see White Eagle Property Group, LLC v. Amrisc,
LLC, No. 6:19-cv-335-Orl-31DCI, 2019 WL 2337005, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 2019)
(distinguishing Outokumpu v. GE as dealing “with a very different set of facts than the case
at hand. It involved an entity that was not a signatory to the contract at issue; here, the
Plaintiff is clearly a party to the contract. The Fifth Circuit case [in Sphere Drake] is on
point, logical, and persuasive. The Eleventh Circuit’s contrary reference to that case is dicta
and the Outokumpu Stainless holding is not inconsistent with the result here.” The Court
accordingly found that an unsigned insurance contract was enforceable.).
152. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2018).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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regard since the Convention does not, in fact, require international
commercial arbitration agreements to be signed.
V.

THE “IN WRITING” REQUIREMENT: INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE

Article II of the Convention provides that
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or
any differences which have arisen or which may arise between
them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration.155
The term “in writing” is then defined to include “an arbitral clause in a
contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in
an exchange of letters or telegrams.”156 This provision reflects the
relatively simple nature of international business transactions at the time
the Convention was concluded in 1958,157 although it was already
recognized at the time of drafting that “[i]t was not customary in
international commerce to have documents signed by the two parties, even
in very important transactions.”158 This is even truer nowadays, when
modern communications and the complexity of international trade mean
155. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art.
II(1), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
156. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art.
II(2), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
157. Interestingly, international conventions on commercial arbitration predating the
New York Convention did not require an arbitration agreement to be signed, or for that
matter, written, in order to be recognized. See Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, 27 L.N.T.S.
157 (1924), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2027/v27.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/9K97-25EX]; Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 92
L.N.T.S. 301 (1929), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2092/v92
.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG9J-8A7R]. Moreover, at the time the New York Convention was
concluded, telegrams were the latest technology. Indeed, “[a]s demonstrated by the
inclusion of telegrams as the then-current technology in Article II(2) NY Convention, the
NY Convention aimed to promote international trade when setting form provisions for
arbitration agreements. The rationale of accommodating business needs by allowing for
contemporary communication technology demands recognition of electronic equivalents if
they equally meet object and purpose of the paper-based requirements.” Reinmar Wolff,
The UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts:
An Overlooked Remedy for Outdated Form Provisions under the New York Convention?, in
60 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: KEY ISSUES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 115–16
(Katia Fach Gómez & Ana M. López Rodríguez eds., 2019).
158. MARIKE R. P. PAULSSON, THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION IN ACTION 79 (2016).
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that “states, corporations, and individuals who are not [signatories] to the
arbitration agreement might wish to become parties” to it or might find
themselves joined as parties regardless of their wishes.159
Any other interpretation of Article II(2) would therefore be “distinctly
old-fashioned.”160 Indeed, the Convention’s drafters “agreed that the ‘in
writing’ requirement should not be interpreted too strictly and could be
regarded as an element susceptible to evolve, such that the formal scope of
Article II would be in alignment with contemporary customs in
international trade.”161 The United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has also recommended that Article II(2) “be
applied recognizing that the circumstances described therein are not
exhaustive.”162 Therefore, while the debate surrounding the appropriate
legal or equitable basis upon which international commercial arbitration
agreements should be applied to non-signatories admittedly remains
“largely unsettled,”163 the basic question of whether or not an actual
signature is necessary to evidence consent to arbitrate now seems to be
mostly answered in the negative.164
159. NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
14 (6th ed. 2015) [emphasis in original].
160. ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 6 (4th ed. 2004); see also Neil Kaplan, Is the Need for Writing as Expressed
in the New York Convention and the Model Law Out of Step with Commercial Practice?, 12
ARB. INT’L 27, 44 (1996) (tracing the evolution of Article II(2) and its “in writing”
requirement and noting that “it is not unreasonable to propose that the time has come for
another look at Article II(2). In my view, its emphasis on writing or exchange is
outmoded.”).
161. MARIKE R. P. PAULSSON, THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION IN ACTION 80 (2016).
162. UNCITRAL, Recommendation Regarding the Interpretation of Article II,
Paragraph 2, and Article VII, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 18 (2015), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/te
xts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-York-Convention-E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JHL-THTU].
Amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law, adopted in 2006, set out two options for
article 7. Option I retains the writing requirement, but provides that “[a]n arbitration
agreement is in writing if its content is recorded in any form, whether or not the arbitration
agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by other means.” MODEL
LAW ON INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art. 7 (UNCITRAL 2006), https://www.uncitral.o
rg/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L6G-XM2
U]. Option II eliminates the writing requirement altogether and provides that an
“Arbitration agreement” is “an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or
certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not.” Id.
163. Stavros Brekoulakis, Parties in International Arbitration: Consent v. Commercial
Reality, in THE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 119 (Stavros
Brekoulakis, Julian D.M. Lew & Loukas Mistelis eds., 2016).
164. ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
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A useful guide to understanding the meaning of the “in writing”
requirement is ICCA’S Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York
Convention: A Handbook for Judges,165 as it reflects “the purpose of the
Convention and the best practices developed in the Contracting States
during more than fifty years.”166 The Guide notes that “the Convention sets
forth a ‘pro-enforcement’, ‘pro-arbitration’ regime which rests on the
presumptive validity – formal and substantive – of arbitration
agreements.”167 It also sets out several generally accepted principles
underlying the Convention, including the “competence-competence”
principle (permitting arbitrators to hear any challenge to their own
jurisdiction) and the limited review of arbitration agreements by courts at a
pre-arbitration stage.168
The Guide confirms that “[e]nforcement of an arbitration agreement
cannot proceed under the Convention if the writing requirement set out in
Article II is not met,” yet establishes a “comparatively liberal substantive
rule on the writing requirement.”169 With regard to the specific question of
whether a non-signatory may successfully invoke or be bound by an
international commercial arbitration agreement, the Guide recognizes as a
starting point that such “an arbitration agreement only confers rights and
imposes obligations on the parties to it.”170 However, who such “parties”
are “cannot be defined solely with regard to the sole signatories of an
arbitration agreement. Non-signatories may also assume the rights and
obligations arising under a contract, under certain conditions.”171
Accordingly, some jurisdictions do not even require arbitration
agreements to be written at all,172 and many national arbitration laws do not
ARBITRATION 136 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that “[i]n the modern laws of arbitration [the
signature] requirement has largely disappeared,” evidencing “a triumph of substance over
form”); Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Extension of Arbitration Agreements to Third Parties:
A Never Ending Legal Quest Through the Spatial-temporal Continuum, in CONFLICT OF
LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 141 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kröll eds., 2011)
(noting that “an arbitration agreement in the vast majority of jurisdictions could be
contained in unsigned exchanged written communications”).
165. INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICCA’S GUIDE TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 60
(2011), https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/13365477041670/judges_guide_english_c
omposite_final_revised_may_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPR6-P5AB].
166. Id. at 37.
167. Id. at 37.
168. Id. at 39–41.
169. Id. at 43.
170. Id. at 58.
171. Id.
172. E.g., Germany (silence is recognized as acceptance in some circumstances),
England (oral arbitration agreements are allowed), Sweden (there are no form requirements
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require arbitration agreements to be signed.173 Under French law, for
instance, “[t]he arbitration agreement is not subject to any formal
requirement,” leading to “[t]he unqualified acceptance of an unwritten
arbitration agreement” and its application to non-signatories.174 Many
national courts have also interpreted Article II(2) “expansively–readily
accepting that there is an agreement in writing–or reading it as merely
setting out some examples of what is an agreement ‘in writing’ within the
meaning of Article II(1).”175
For instance, some courts have found non-signatories to be bound by
international commercial arbitration agreements under the “group of
companies” doctrine, including the courts of Brazil,176 India177 and
at all), France (the parties’ consent can be established by any possible means). JEANFRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 160–65 paras. 196–203 (2d ed. 2007).
173. In addition to the American FAA, 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (2018), see, e.g., Arbitration Act
1996, 1996 c. 23, § 5(4) (Eng.); LOI FÉDÉRALE SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [LDIP],
FEDERAL CODE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW [CPIL] Dec. 18, 1987, RS 291, art. 178(1)
(Switz.); CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 1443 (Fr.);
Arbitration Act 1996, sch. 1, s 7 (N.Z.); The Arbitration Law, 5728–1968, § 1, 22 LSI 210
(1967–68) (as amended); Dutch Arbitration Act 1986, Stb. 1986, 372; Law No. 27 of 1994
(Law Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters), AL-JARĪDAH AL-RASMĪYAH,
vol. 16 bis, 21 April 1994, art. 12 (Egypt).
174. Philippe Pinsolle, A French View on the Application of the Arbitration Agreement
to Non-Signatories, in THE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 211
(Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian D.M. Lew & Loukas Mistelis eds., 2016).
175. INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICCA’S GUIDE TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 44
(2011), https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/13365477041670/judges_guide_english_c
omposite_final_revised_may_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPR6-P5AB].
176. Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Extension of Arbitration Agreements to Third Parties:
A Never Ending Legal Quest Through the Spatial-temporal Continuum, in CONFLICT OF
LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 157 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kröll eds., 2011)
(referring to the decision of the Sao Paulo State Court of Appeals in Trelleborg v. Anel,
D.J.S.P.-7, Ap. Civ. No. 267.450.4/6.00, Relator: Des. Constança Gonzaga, 24.5.2006
(Braz.)).
177. NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
87 (6th ed. 2015) (referring to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Chloro
Controls (I) P Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. & Ors, Sep. 28, 2012, where the
Court relied on the “real intentions of the parties” in concluding that an arbitration clause
should be extended to a non-signatory); see also Ashutosh Kumar, Raina Upadhyay, Anusha
Jegadeesh & Yakshay Chheda, Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention
in India, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION BY NATIONAL COURTS
474 (George A. Bermann ed., 2017) (“Chloro Controls (I) Pvt Ltd v Severn Trent Water
Purification Inc & Ors put forward a positive approach towards international arbitration by
referring multiple parties to arbitration (including certain non-signatories) based on the
‘group of companies’ doctrine.”).
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France.178 French courts have also found non-signatories bound where they
participated in the negotiation or performance of the underlying contract,
where the contract has been assigned to them,179 and where they were found
to be third party beneficiaries under it.180 In Switzerland, “[i]f a corporate
group wishes to avoid having non-signatory affiliates pulled into
arbitration, it should clearly communicate which entity is or is not
considered bound by the contract,”181 since the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court has found that the absence of a signature is not a bar to applying the
arbitration clause to a third party.182 The courts of Hong Kong have found
that communications exchanged between the parties provide sufficient
record “in writing” of their agreement to arbitrate, despite the fact that the
arbitration agreement was not signed by either party.183 They have also held
that an arbitration clause did not have to be between the same parties as the
contract into which the arbitration clause was incorporated by reference.184
178. Pierre Mayer, Extension of the Arbitration Clause to Non-Signatories Under French
Law, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 189 (Belinda
Macmahon ed., 2009).
179. Id.; NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 89 (6th ed. 2015) (referring to the decision of the Cour de cassation in Sté
Alcatel Business Systems et Alcatel Micro Electronics c/v and ors of Mar. 27, 2007);
Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Extension of Arbitration Agreements to Third Parties: A Never
Ending Legal Quest Through the Spatial-temporal Continuum, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 163 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kröll eds., 2011) (referring to
the decision of the Cour de cassation in Société Taurus Films v. Les Film du Jeudi of Feb. 8,
2000).
180. NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
88 (6th ed. 2015) (referring to the Cour de Cassation’s decision in Banque populaire Loire
et Iyonnais v. Société Sangar of July 11, 2006, where the Court held that “where a contract
conferring a benefit on a third party . . . contains an arbitration clause, the third party is
obliged to refer any claim to arbitration.” The authors also refer to a similar decision by the
Italian Corte di Cassazione in Assicuraziono Generali SpA v. Tassinari, of Mar. 18, 1997);
Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Extension of Arbitration Agreements to Third Parties: A Never
Ending Legal Quest Through the Spatial-temporal Continuum, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 162 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kröll eds., 2011) (referring to
the decision of the Lisbon Court of Appeals (Portugal) of Jan. 13, 2010, process no.
373/09.0TTLSB. L1-4).
181. Georg von Segesser, Swiss Supreme Court Extends Arbitration Agreement to a
Third Party: Potential Risk for Corporate Groups, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 3, 2015), http:
//arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/06/03/swiss-supreme-court-extends-arbitration
-agreement-to-a-third-party-potential-risk-for-corporate-groups/ [https://perma.cc/2C8K-FH
42].
182. Tribunale Federale [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 16, 2003, 129 DECISIONE
DEL TRIBUNALE FEDERALE [DTF] III 736 (Switz.).
183. Oonc Lines Ltd. v. Sino-Am. Trade Advancement Co., [1994] 35 H.K.C. 1 (H.C.)
(H.K.).
184. Astel-Peiniger Joint Venture v. Argos Eng’g, Heavy Indus. Co., [1994] 3 H.K.C.
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In England, courts have compelled non-signatories to join arbitral
proceedings on the basis of a relationship of agency185 or assignment.186
Agency has also been applied as grounds for finding a non-signatory
(namely, the principal) bound by an international commercial arbitration
agreement by courts in Sweden, Austria, Italy, France, and Germany.187
Israeli courts have found that there are circumstances in which nonsignatories may be bound by an international commercial arbitration
agreement where the interpretation of the agreement and the parties’
relationship suggest that the non-signatory party agreed to take part in the
arbitration, and where the parties should be prevented from evading an
arbitration to which they had substantively agreed by relying on formalistic
arguments.188 Similarly, Israeli courts have found that a non-signatory to
an international commercial arbitration agreement may be bound by it if it
had substantial proximity to the matter, had taken part in the proceedings,
or its interest was represented in the proceedings.189 In Australia, courts
have held that “Article II does not say that the only agreement to which it
refers is one which was formed or concluded by the act of signing.”190 A
Canadian court has also defined “agreement in writing” inclusively rather
than exhaustively, the important issue being that there “be a record to
evidence the agreement of the parties to resolve the dispute by an arbitral
process.”191 Another Canadian court has similarly held that “a formal
executed written agreement is not required to prove that a written
agreement existed between contracting parties and the simple exchange of
electronic communications between parties may be sufficient.”192 In short,
328 (H.C.) (H.K.).
185. Hanna Roos, Agency as a Mechanism for Compelling a Non-Signatory to Join
Arbitral Proceedings, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 21, 2009), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbi
tration.com/2009/12/21/agency-as-a-mechanism-for-compelling-a-non-signatory-to-join-arb
itral-proceedings/ [https://perma.cc/7QLG-2W3A].
186. NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
89 (6th ed. 2015) (referring the English case of West Tankers Inc. v. RAS Riunione Adriatica
di Sicurta SpA [2005] EWHC (Comm) 454).
187. Id. at 90.
188. CA 1030/15 Yehoyachin Yosef Hadad v. Gabriel Dadon and Abante Holdings
Limited (2015) (Isr.) (on file with author).
189. CC (TA) 31228-06-13 Simin Ltd. v. International Trade Exchange Ltd. (2014) (Isr.)
(on file with author).
190. Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Austl Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192 (Austl.).
191. Proctor v. Schellenberg, 2002 MBCA 170, para. 18 (Can.).
192. Brentwood Plastics Inc. v. Topsyn Flexible Packaging Ltd., 2014 MBQB 97, para.
36 (Can.); see also Schiff Food Products Inc. v. Naber Seed & Grain Co., [1997] 1 W.W.R.
124 (Can.) (finding that “[i]t is a basic principle of law that . . . parties may be contractually
bound without signing documents. Acceptance [of a contract containing an arbitration
clause] need not be in writing but may be inferred by conduct.”). However, there appears to
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There seems little doubt that in certain cases it is necessary and
justified that an individual or entity shall be bound by an
arbitration agreement, thereby becoming a party to the
arbitration, even though there is no signature by such individual
or entity in the agreement containing the arbitration clause.193
Indeed, the District Court in Outokumpu v. GE did not seem to doubt
that GE, a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement, could compel
Outokumpu, a signatory, to arbitrate pursuant to the international
arbitration agreement contained in the latter’s Contracts with Fives. As this
section has illustrated, this decision is supported by a wide consensus in
international commercial arbitration practice that “a signature is no longer a
decisive criterion for determining the parties to an arbitration
agreement.”194 Rather, the true intentions of the parties must be
ascertained. This does not render consent irrelevant but merely operates to
identify such consent where traditional formalities are absent.195 This
liberal interpretation of the Convention’s “in writing” requirement is also
warranted in light of the complex nature of modern commercial
transactions––”[a]n inflexible application of the Convention’s writing
requirement would contradict the current and widespread business usages
and be contrary to the pro-enforcement thrust of the Convention.”196
be some inconsistency also in Canadian case law interpreting the “in writing” requirement.
See Javor v. Francoeur, 2003 BCSC 350, para. 16 (finding that “‘party’ means party to an
arbitration agreement . . .’ and that the arbitration agreement ‘ . . . must be in writing . . .’
and is deemed in writing ‘. . . if it is contained in a document signed by the parties . . .’”).
193. Nathalie Voser, The Swiss Perspective on Parties in Arbitration: “Traditional
Approach with a Twist Regarding Abuse of Rights” or “Consent Theory Plus”, in THE
EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 161 (Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian
D.M. Lew & Loukas Mistelis eds., 2016).
194. JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 211 para. 250 (2d ed. 2007).
195. William W. Park, Non-Signatories and International Contracts: An Arbitrator’s
Dilemma, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 6, 14–15 (2009).
Non-signatories have been able to arbitrate on theories of, inter alia, estoppel, alter ego,
apparent authority, transfer and assignment, and the group of companies doctrine. Stavros
Brekoulakis, Parties in International Arbitration: Consent v. Commercial Reality, in THE
EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 120 (Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian
D.M. Lew & Loukas Mistelis eds., 2016). However, Brekoulakis criticizes the use of such
doctrines for requiring courts to engage in “a complex quest for elusive consent,” arguing
instead that adjudicators should focus on “the scope of the dispute submitted for arbitration
and the scope of the original arbitration clause” in deciding whether to apply it to nonsignatories. Id. at 121–22. Nonetheless, Brekoulakis does not challenge the position that a
signature, as such, is not required for such application.
196. INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICCA’S GUIDE TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 45
(2011), https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/13365477041670/judges_guide_english_c
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CONCLUSION

Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court cautioned that
National courts . . . need to “shake off the old judicial hostility to
arbitration,” and also their customary and understandable
unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under
domestic law to a foreign or transnational tribunal. To this
extent, at least, it will be necessary for national courts to
subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international
policy favoring commercial arbitration.197
By attaching an unduly narrow and overly technical interpretation to the “in
writing” requirement under Article II(2) of the Convention, the Eleventh
Circuit in Outokumpu v. GE, as well as several other U.S. federal district
and appellate courts, have failed to heed this admonition.
The decision of the Eleventh Circuit seems to rest on the assumption
that to apply the arbitration agreement to GE as a non-signatory would
violate the “in writing” requirement of the Convention. However, it has
been clearly recognized, both by other U.S. courts and in international
commercial arbitration practice, that allowing a non-signatory to invoke an
arbitration agreement is not in conflict with this requirement.198 There are
two reasons for this. First, to require an actual signature as evidence of
consent to arbitrate misses entirely the real question in cases involving nonsignatories, which is “who is really a party to the agreement and, in
consequence, can rely on it or is bound by it”?199 Second, a strict signature
requirement risks inviting potentially absurd outcomes. For instance,
parties who have accepted an arbitration agreement by way of conduct, but
have not signed it, would be able to evade arbitration,200 while a mere
signatory to an arbitration agreement, such as an agent, could find itself

omposite_final_revised_may_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPR6-P5AB].
197. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638–39
(1985) (citation omitted).
198. INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICCA’S GUIDE TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 59
(2011), https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/13365477041670/judges_guide_english_c
omposite_final_revised_may_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPR6-P5AB].
199. JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 211 para. 250 (2d ed. 2007).
200. Types of arbitration agreements that are commonly relied upon in modern
international trade, but are typically not signed include: “clauses in standard conditions;
clauses forming direct or indirect part of a bill of lading or charter party; and clauses that
parties deem to be part of the contract through incorporation by reference.” See MARIKE R.
P. PAULSSON, THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION IN ACTION 78 (2016).
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bound by it even though it is not in fact a proper party to the agreement.201
This is clearly not the intention or spirit of the Convention, or the FAA.
Moreover, not only did the Eleventh Circuit in Outokumpu v. GE
misinterpret the Convention as restricting arbitration to the actual
signatories of the arbitration agreement, it also misconstrued the
Convention as setting out rigid standards that national courts cannot
derogate from, even where more favorable rules are available. However,
the Convention in fact sets a flexible standard, which does not preclude the
application of less stringent domestic requirements for applying
international commercial arbitration agreements to non-signatories.
Therefore, even if we were to accept the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning that
the Convention and international arbitration law require written and signed
arbitration agreements, it could still have legitimately allowed GE’s motion
to compel arbitration. The rationale would be as follows: since there is no
signature requirement under Chapter One of the FAA, and the Convention
allows national courts to rely on more favorable domestic laws when
interpreting Article II(2), the Eleventh Circuit could have extended the “in
writing but not signed” requirement of Chapter One to the arbitration
agreement in this case even though it is governed by Chapter Two. Indeed,
U.S. courts have consistently extended pro-arbitration provisions of
Chapter One to cases falling under Chapter Two. For instance, while
Chapter Two contains a provision allowing a court to compel arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration agreement that falls under the Convention, it does
not provide for a stay or dismissal of court proceedings in such
circumstances.202 For this, the courts have relied on § 3 of Chapter One.203
This section permits a party seeking to arbitrate, whether a signatory or a
non-signatory,204 to request that the court stay or dismiss litigation
201. JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 211 para. 250 (2d ed. 2007).
202. The difference between a stay of proceedings and a motion to compel is that the
former “merely arrests further action by the court itself in the suit until something outside
the suit has occurred; but the court does not order that it shall be done,” whereas the latter
“affirmatively orders that someone do (or refrain from doing) some act outside the suit.”
Kulukundis Shipping Co., v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 987 (2d Cir. 1942).
203. John Fellas, Enforcing International Arbitration Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 206–07, 233 (James H. Carter & John Fellas eds.,
2010); see, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (reversing the decision
of the Seventh Circuit and denying an application for a stay of proceedings under § 3 of
Chapter One in favor of an international arbitration agreement); Reid v. Doe Run Res.
Corp., 701 F.3d 840, 846 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting that “claims made by nonsignatories can be
subject to a stay under 9 U.S.C. § 3”).
204. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 632 (2009) (holding that “a litigant
who was not a party to the relevant arbitration agreement may invoke § 3 if the relevant
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commenced in violation of the arbitration agreement.205
The consensual nature of arbitration has often been invoked in support
of the position that non-signatories should not be bound by arbitration
agreements. National courts determining the validity of international
commercial arbitration agreements should no doubt protect this
fundamental principle of party consent to arbitration. However, what this
principle actually means is that an arbitration agreement only binds parties
who have accepted it, rather than those who have signed it. It is the courts’
task to identify when “a person who is a non-signatory [should] stand in the
shoes . . . of a regular party.”206 Indeed, “fulfilling the ends of justice
requires striking the proper balance between the principle of privity and
considerations of justice and fairness, which may entail extending the
arbitration agreement to a non-signatory.”207 Therefore, domestic courts
should also recognize that consent is not always, nor is it required to be,
reflected in an actual signature. Rather, the arbitration agreement can take
“its binding force through some circumstance other than the formality of
signature” and consent can be “express, implied or incorporated by
reference to other documents or transactions.”208 Therefore, “[i]t is not
justified, at least in international arbitration, to opt for a ‘restrictive’
interpretation of the arbitration clause.”209
This should apply with equal force to U.S. courts, whose “first task”
when “asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.”210 The courts are to make this
determination by applying the “federal substantive law of arbitrability,
applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the [Federal
Arbitration] Act.”211 Federal substantive law, in turn, provides “that
questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
state contract law allows him to enforce the agreement”).
205. John Fellas, Enforcing International Arbitration Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 234 (James H. Carter & John Fellas eds., 2010).
206. Justice Breyer, oral argument in GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp.
v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, No. 18-1048, Jan. 21, 2020, at 42, https://www.scotusblog.c
om/case-files/cases/ge-energy-power-conversion-france-sas-v-outokumpu-stainless-usa-llc/.
207. Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Extension of Arbitration Agreements to Third Parties:
A Never Ending Legal Quest Through the Spatial-temporal Continuum, in CONFLICT OF
LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 139 (Franco Ferrari & Stefan Kröll eds., 2011).
208. William W. Park, Non-Signatories and International Contracts: An Arbitrator’s
Dilemma, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 9–10 (2009).
209. JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 228 para. 264 (2d ed. 2007).
210. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985).
211. Id.
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federal policy favoring arbitration.”212 Where international commercial
arbitration agreements are at issue, in particular, “[i]f the United States is to
be able to gain the benefits of international accords and have a role as a
trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be most cautious
before interpreting its domestic legislation in such manner as to violate
international agreements.”213 The Eleventh Circuit in Outokumpu v. GE
indeed recognized, at least in principle, the pro-arbitration policy of the
FAA and the Convention. It failed, however, as did the Ninth Circuit and
other courts, to adhere to this policy in practice, creating needless
uncertainty and confusion for parties seeking to enforce international
commercial arbitration agreements in the United States and jeopardizing
the overarching goal of the Convention—to achieve predictability and
uniformity in its application.214 While the Chief U.S. District Judge,
hearing this case on remand, declined “GE Energy’s invitation to reevaluate the wisdom of the Eleventh Circuit,”215 one hopes that the
Supreme Court will take up this task.

212. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
213. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995).
214. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he goal of the Convention, and the principal
purpose underlying American adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts
and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards
are enforced in the signatory countries.” Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520
n.15 (1974).
215. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, No. 16-0378-KD-C, 2019
WL 1748110, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 2019).

